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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented upon this appeal are as follows: 
a. Was the Respondent's action and the trial court's judgment to 
enforce the payment and personal property provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce beyond the eight (8), year statute of limitations provided by Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22? The issue was preserved at R.80-85, 
andTr. 1-3,11,61-65. 
b. Was the Respondent guilty of laches preventing enforcement of the 
Decree of Divorce where the Petitioner's evidence was lost or destroyed thus 
prejudicing the Petitioner in presenting his proof at the evidentiary hearing? 
The issue was preserved atR.80-85, andTr. 1-3,11, 43-51, 61-65, 70. 
c. Was there insufficient evidence as to the value of the personal 
property to justify a judgment against the Petitioner in the amount of 
$8,172.00? The issue was preserved at Tr. 1-2, 7-34, 37-41, 64-65, 66-67. 
d. Is the Petitioner entitled to an award of his costs and attorney fees 
incurred in defense of the Respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause 
and upon this appeal? The issue was preserved at R. 84, and Tr. 51-52. 
1 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for the issue of whether a statute of limitation 
has expired is a question of law which the Court of Appeals reviews for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the lower court. Gramlich v. 
Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992), Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 977 
P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999), Stewart v. State By and Through Deland. 
830P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992). 
The standard of review for the issues involving factual determinations 
is that the trial court's findings of fact are given deference and will not be 
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987), and 
Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioner and Appellant, Greg J. Hansen, and the Respondent 
and Appellee, Julie Ann (Hansen) Kik, were married on June 27, 1976, and 
were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the Sixth Judicial District 
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Court for Sanpete County within the State of Utah on November 15, 1994, 
after over 18 years of marriage. R. 1-3, 60-66. 
The decree awarded the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, $4,000.00, 
to be paid by the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, as consideration for her equity in 
a trailer and real property. The decree also awarded the Respondent, Julie 
(Hansen) Kik, certain items of personal property identified on Exhibit 1, 
attached to the Decree of Divorce. R. 60-66. 
Nearly ten (10), years* later, on September 30, 2004, the Respondent, 
Julie Kik, filed her Motion for Order to Show Cause with the trial court 
requesting that the Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, be held in contempt for non-
compliance with the orders of the Decree of Divorce that he pay her 
$4,000.00, for her equity in the marital residence and deliver certain 
personal property to her. R. 67-79. 
On October 20, 2004, the Respondent, Greg J. Hansen, filed his. 
Affidavit of Greg J. Hansen asserting his payments to the Respondent and 
the delivery of the personal property, the eight year statute of limitations 
upon the enforcement of the decree, the equitable defense of laches, 
prejudice because of the Respondent's ten (10), year delay in bringing her 
3 
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claims, inability to acquire records from his credit union and employer to 
prove that he had paid the Respondent, and that he should be awarded his 
costs and attorney fees for having to defend the Respondent's meritless and 
frivolous motion which violated the eight year statute of limitations. R. 80-
85. 
On October 22, 2004, the trial court heard the testimony of Julie Ann 
(Hansen) Kik and Greg J. Hansen, and their adult daughter, Christie. R. 86-
87. 
On May 5, 2005, the trial court entered it's Amended Order on Order 
to Show Cause and Judgment awarding judgment to the Respondent and 
against Mr. Greg Hansen, the Petitioner, for $4,000.00, together with interest 
for her equity in the trailer and real property, and $6,855.00, for personal 
property. R. 125-129. 
On May 18, 2005, the Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, filed his Notice of 
Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. R. 139-140. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. The Petitioner and Appellant, Greg J. Hansen, and the Respondent 
and Appellee, Julie Ann (Hansen) Kik, were married on June 27, 1976, and 
were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court for Sanpete County within the State of Utah on November 15, 1994, 
after over 18 years of marriage. R. 1-3; 60-66, 
b. Paragraph 4, of the Decree of Divorce entered on November 15, 
1994, provided that the Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, pay the Respondent, Julie 
Ann (Hansen) Kik, the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00), for her 
interest in a mobile home and real property. R. 61. 
c. Paragraph 7, of the Decree of Divorce entered on November 15, 
1994, awarded each of the parties' ownership of certain personal property 
and ordered the Petitioner to store certain items of the personal property, 
identified on Exhibit 1, to the Decree, awarded to the Respondent at the 
marital residence until the Respondent could remove it. There was no 
Exhibit 1, which was attached to the Decree of Divorce. R. 62; 65-66. 
d. On September 30,2004, at the behest of the Respondent, Julie Ann 
(Hansen) Kik, the trial Court issued it's Order to Show Cause requiring the 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, appear and show cause why he should not be 
held in contempt for non-compliance with the orders of the Decree of 
Divorce entered almost ten (10), years before. R. 67-79. 
e. The Respondent's motion and the Order to Show Cause also 
requested a judgment against the Petitioner and that he be ordered to pay the 
Respondent Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00), together with interest, for 
her equity in the real property pursuant to the order in paragraph 4, of the 
Decree of Divorce. R.67-79. 
f. The Respondent's motion and the Order to Show Cause also 
requested the Respondent's personal property awarded her pursuant to the 
order in paragraph 7, of the Decree of Divorce, or in the alternative, a money 
judgment together with interest, for the value of the personal property 
awarded the Respondent by the Decree of Divorce. R. 67-79. 
g. The Petitioner filed his Affidavit of Greg J. Hansen in response 
and objecting to the Respondent's affidavit and Motion for Order to Show 
Cause asserting that the judgment was entered almost ten (10), years before 
and the action was barred by the eight year period of limitations upon the 
enforcement of the decree and the collection of said sums and personal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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properties. R. 81. Mr. Hansen asserted the equitable defenses of laches 
because the Respondent had waited nearly ten (10), years to make her claims 
prejudicing him in his proof because he could no longer obtain the records 
from his credit union to prove his payments to her. R. 82. Mr. Hansen 
asserted payment and set offs and that he had delivered the Respondent's 
personal property to her. R. 80-84. Mr. Hansen requested costs and attorney 
fees based upon the Respondent's untimely action (beyond the eight year 
statute of limitations) and thus meritless action against him. R. 84. 
h. The Respondent's hearing on her Motion for Order to Show Cause 
was held before the Honorable Paul D. Lyman on October 22,2004, and the 
parties and their daughter, Christie, testified at the hearing as to the claims 
and defenses, including the statute of limitations, laches, and the delivery 
and values of the personal property the Respondent claimed she had not 
received from Mr. Hansen. R. 86-88; Tr. 1-71. 
i. The Respondent, Julie Hansen Kik, testified that she and the 
Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, were divorced on November 15,1994. Tr. 4, 11. 
She testified that she had called Mr. Hansen on the telephone and had once, 
7 
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six years before the hearing, sent him a letter requesting the $4,000.00, in 
equity and that she had not been paid the money. Tr. 5-7, 35. 
j . Ms. (Hansen) Kik testified that she, or her attorney, had retyped a 
list of the personal property she had not received, and to the values of the 
personal property. Tr. 7-11, 19, 14-33, trial Exhibit 1. She testified that the 
values she had assigned to each of the items of personal property the day 
before the hearing were a "guess". Tr. 17($3,500 china cupboard), Tr. 17-
18($40 Indian picture), Tr. 18($40Elk, $40 Eagle, $40 Indian pictures), Tr. 
20-21 ($150 sheets and bedding), Tr. 21 ($50 towels and washcloths), Tr. 22-
24($200 pots, pans, cookie sheets, glassware), Tr. 25, ($75 bowls, saucers, 
plates), Tr. 25-26($300 18 1/2 year old bed), Tr. 27-28($500 16year old 
freezer with meat), Tr. 28-29($100 Christmas ornaments), Tr. 30-31 ($1,600 
Kirby vacuum), Tr. 31-32 ($1,000 bibs, winter coats, yearbooks, clothing), 
Exhibit I, inter alia, ($200 Books of Choice)($50 Items of Choice from Old 
House & Tin Shed) (Plants) ($100 Bar Stools & Half of Lawn Chairs). All of 
the items of personal property several years old and well used at the time of 
the parties' divorce in November, 1994. Tr. 14-33. 
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k, Ms. (Hansen) Kik testified that the reason she waited 10 years to 
bring this matter to the court was because "I did not want to get my children 
involved first of all, and he intimidates me and he always has throughout my 
whole marriage." Tr. 34. She had remarried in 1997, and was again 
divorced in March, 2004. Tr. 34-35. 
1. The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, testified to the payments he had 
made to the Respondent by checks on his accounts at and by direct deposit 
by his employer to the Moroni Feed Credit Union. He testified that he had 
paid Ms. Kik her equity. Tr. 43-47, 52. Mr. Hansen had gone to the credit 
union attempting to acquire records to prove his payments to the Respondent 
only to learn that the records do not exist and are only kept for seven years. 
Mr. Hansen testified that he had gone to his employer to obtain records of 
his payments to the Respondent and the records of his direct deposits no 
longer existed. Tr. 42-47, 52-58. 
m. The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified that he had been prejudiced 
by the Respondent's failure to make her claims for nearly ten (10), years 
because he could not acquire the records to prove that he had paid her. Tr. 
42-47, 50, 52-53. 
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n. The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified as to the disposition and the 
values of the personal property. Tr. 38-42, 47-51. Mr. Hansen testified that 
he had stored the Respondent's personal property at his trailer for four to 
five years when he boxed the items up and put them in a storage unit at 
Universal Storage in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. The cost of the storage unit to Mr. 
Hansen was $55.00, each month. The Respondent's personal property 
remained in the storage unit for nearly two years. Tr. 47-48. Then the 
parties' daughter, Christy, married and purchased a new home and Mr. 
Hansen asked her if he could move the personal property to her garage and 
he did. Tr. 46-47. 
o. The parties' daughter, Christy Dawn Mickelson, testified that her 
father, Mr. Hansen, had brought her mother's personal property to her home 
and put it into half of her garage, after she was married, over 5 years ago. 
She testified that she could not remember much of what had happened after 
the divorce because it had been "too long ago." Christy testified that she 
called her mother and had asked her to come and take her personal property. 
She testified that her mother had taken the personal property from her garage 
to a yard sale. Tr. 58-61. 
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p. The trial Court concluded that no judgment had been entered by 
the Decree of Divorce and that no deadline had been set therein for the 
payment of the Respondent's equity. Tr. 67. The trial court made did not 
make findings upon the values of the personal property the Respondent 
claimed she had not received. Tr. 66-69. The trial court made oral findings 
on the issue of laches. Tr. 70. 
q. On the 5th day of May, 2005, the trial court entered it's Amended 
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment awarding judgment against the 
Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, and for the Respondent in the amount of 
$6,855.00, for the value of the personal property and the amount of 
$4,000.00, together with interest for the Respondent's equity in the mobile 
home and real property. R. 125-J 29. 
r. The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, filed his Notice of Appeal in the 
trial court on the 18th day of May, 2005. R. 139. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Respondent's claims to enforce paragraphs four and seven of the 
Decree of Divorce, filed September 30, 2004, nearly ten years after the entry 
of the decree on November 15,2005, and the Judgment entered by the trial 
_. court against Mr. Hansen upon the Respondent's claims violated the eight 
year statute of limitations embodied in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-
22(1). The judgments should be reversed and vacated. The Respondent's 
enforcement claims should be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. 
The claims of the Respondent on September 30, 2004, to equity and to 
personal property awarded her by the Decree of Divorce entered nearly ten 
years before was dilatory and Ms. (Hansen) Kik was guilty of laches. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and vacated 
because of the delay of the Respondent in bringing her claims to the trial 
court and because her delay disadvantaged and prejudiced the Petitioner, 
Greg Hansen, in his proof. 
The trial court in this action clearly abused its discretion when it 
awarded Ms. (Hansen) Kik a judgment for the value of personal property 
based upon evidence that admittedly was a guess, and thus based upon 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
speculation and conjecture, ten years after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. > 
The trial court's judgment for the Respondent, Ms. (Hansen) Kik and 
against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, should he reversed and vacated. The 
Respondent's claim for the value of the property should be dismissed. 
The Respondent and her counsel had no reasonable factual or legal 
basis for pursuing their motion, nor to compel Mr. Hansen to pursue this 
appeal in order to vacate the judgment they obtained by their frivolous 
motion. The motion was unwarranted under the law existing at the time of 
the motion. The Respondent and her counsel have no reasonable factual or 
legal basis to oppose the reversal of the trial court's judgment arising out of 
their frivolous motion for order to show cause and the pursuit of their claims 
both before and after trial. O 'Brien v. Rush, 1AA P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, should be awarded his damages, costs 
and attorney fees suffered by him in the trial court below and upon this 
appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE RESPONDENT'S ACTION AND THE JUDGMENT WAS 
PROHIBITED BY AND VIOLATED THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-12-22. 
The judgment entered against Greg J. Hansen by the trial court, at the 
demand of the Respondent, Julie (Hansen) Kik, is against the law and time 
barred because the Respondent's claims were not brought by her until a date 
beyond the ixuming of the eight year statute of limitations embodied in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22. The trial court's judgment should be 
reversed. 
The issue of whether a statute of limitations has expired is a question 
of law and the Court of Appeals reviews the conclusion for correctness, 
giving no particular deference to the trial court. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 
977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999); Gramlich v. Mmsey, 838 P:2d 1131,1132 
(Utah 1992); Statev.Pena 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22, provides: 
An action may be brought within eight years . . . upon a judgment or 
decree of any court of the United States, or of any state . . . within the 
United States. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this action, the Decree of Divorce was entered in the trial court on 
November 15,1994. R. 60-66. The case file reflects that no pleadings were 
filed in the action following the entry of the decree until September 30, 
2004, when Julie Kik first filed her motion for order to show cause 
requesting Mr. Hansen be held in contempt, requesting judgment for her 
equity in the marital residence and the return of personal property awarded 
to her or, in the alternative, a money judgment for the value of the personal 
property. R. 67-75. 
The statute of limitations expired on the claims of Julie (Hansen) Kik 
for $4,000.00, equity in the marital residence and upon her claim for 
personal property on Exhibit 1, to the Decree of Divorce, on November 14, 
2002.1 
Generally, "Statutes of limitation are intended to compel the exercise 
of a right of action within a reasonable time and to suppress stale and 
fraudulent claims so that claims are advanced while evidence to rebut them 
is still fresh."Horton v. Goldminer'sDaughter, 785 P.2d 1087,1091 (Utah 
1
 The Decree of Divorce does not have an Exhibit 1, attached to it in the trial court's file, identifying items 
of personal property which the Respondent can now enforce. The Exhibit 1, offered by the Respondent and 
admitted at trial was "retyped" the day before the hearing and the Respondent "guessed" as to the value of 
the personal property identified thereon. Tr. 7,19, 14-31. 
15 
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1989). Statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254,1257 (Utah 
1983). 
It has been a long held proposition of law that a decree of divorce is 
subject to the eight year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-22. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a), defines a "judgment" as 
"including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." 
In Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court 
directly visited the issue of whether the eight year statute of limitations 
applies to decrees and orders in divorce actions and reviewed decades old 
precedent establishing that the limitation applies. See Beesley v. Badger, 
240 P. 458 (Utah 1925), Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943). 
The rule has been recently reaffirmed by this Court in Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999), when the Court had occasion 
to consider facts nearly identical to those in this case. In Kessimakis, id., the 
former wife requested enforcement of a provision of the decree of divorce 
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ordering her former husband to execute and deliver appropriate documents 
evidencing transfer of her interest in a closely held corporation. This Court, 
in detenriining that the former wife's enforcement claims were barred by the 
eight year statute of limitations stated: 
Ms. Kessimakis's action also presents a request for enforcement of the 
decree's requirement that Mr. Kessimakis "execute and deliver 
appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer" of an interest in the 
Corporation to Ms. Kessimakis. This provision of the decree created 
a judgment in Ms. Kessimakis's favor. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a) 
(defining "judgment" as "includ[ing] a decree and any order from 
which an appeal lies") Ms. Kessimakis's action is thus subject to the 
eight year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-
22(l)(1996(("An action may be brought within eight years . . . upon a 
judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state .. 
within the United States.") 
Statutes of limitations reflect our understanding that a party will 
generally choose to pursue a valid claim, rather than waiting 
indefinitely to do so. See 51 Am. Jur.2 Limitation of Actions Section 
17 (1970). They "'attempt to protect against the difficulties caused by 
lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses. '"Lund v. 
Hall, 938 P.2d 285,291 (Utah 1997) (quoting Byrne v. Ogle, 488 
P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1971)). In this case, the passage of time has 
created precisely those difficulties: the parties possess little evidence, 
documentary or otherwise, and several potential witnesses have died. 
We agree with the trial court that Ms. Kessimakis's effort to require 
Mr. Kessimakis to deliver documents of title showing her interest in 
the Corporation is barred by the eight year statute of limitations. See 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-22(1) (1996). 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this action the Decree of Divorce was entered on November 15, 
1994, nearly 10 years before Ms. (Hansen) Kik chose to file her claim 
against Mr. Hansen for the $4,000.00, equity in the marital residence and her 
claim for unidentified items of personal property. She filed her enforcement 
action on September 30, 2004. 
Mr. Hansen paid Julie (Hansen) Kik for her equity in the marital 
residence soon after the divorce and when served with the Respondents 
motion attempted to obtain his checks and other records from the Moroni 
Feed Credit Union which would prove his payments to her. The records did 
not exist because the Moroni Feed Credit Union only keeps such records for 
seven years. 
Mr. Hansen went to his employer to prove the payroll deductions to 
Ms. (Hansen) Kik's account but his employer no longer had the records of 
his payroll deductions. 
The trial court in this action incorrectly concluded that the Court's 
decree entered on November 15,1994, that Mr. Hansen pay Julie (Hansen) 
Kik $4,000.00, for her equity in the marital residence was not a judgment 
and thus not subject to the eight year statute of limitations because " . . . there 
IS 
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was no deadline to pay. It was not a judgment." Tr. 67. Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(a), id. 
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that the Respondent, Julie 
(Hansen) Kik, was entitled to judgment against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, 
for the value of personal property awarded to her by the non-existent Exhibit 
1, to the Decree of Divorce, entered nearly 10, years before on November 
15,1994. 
Mr. Hansen, after the divorce, had stored his ex-wife's personal 
property at his trailer for four to five years, and then moved it to the 
Universal Storage at a cost to him of $55.00, per month for almost two 
years. He then moved it to the parties' daughter's garage where Ms. Kik 
apparently retrieved some of her personal property and took it to a yard sale. 
The personal property was well used and several years old at the time of the 
divorce on November 15,1994. 
The reasons for the statute of limitations barring enforcement of the 
personal property provision of the decree are just as compelling as those for 
barring enforcement of the payment of the equity provision of the decree of 
divorce. Personal property, such as clothing, coats, bibs, glasses, plates, 
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bowls and saucers, pots and pans, choice of books, Christmas ornaments, the 
vacuum, pictures, towels, washcloths, sheets and quilts, Lawn chairs, Items 
of Choice in the Old House & Tin Shed, get lost or broken, reduce in value 
and disappear over time. Choices disappear. The parties' have no way of 
accurately determining the value of personal property that no longer exists, 
or has been lost or destroyed. The Tin Shed falls down. The parties' and the 
witnesses' memories had faded concerning the items that were put in 
Christy's garage and retrieved by the Respondent. The Respondent failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence in bringing the matter to the trial court's 
attention, or otherwise seek timely relief and enforcement of the decree. 
Assuming mat the personal property was not delivered to the 
Respondent, how long should have Mr. Hansen kept Julie Kik's personal 
property in his home for her? How long may the Respondent wait before 
she chooses to enforce the decree's personal property provision in the trial 
court? If the Respondent's and the trial court's premise that the decree in 
this case was "not a judgment" because no time limits were set, and thus not 
subject to the eight year statute of limitations, the Respondent could have 
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waited not ten, but twenty or thirty years to enforce the decree and file her 
claim for personal property and her equity in the marital residence. 
The Respondent's claims to enforce paragraphs four and seven of the 
Decree of Divorce, filed September 30,2004, nearly ten years after the entry 
of the decree on November 15,2005, and the Judgment entered by the trial 
court against Mr. Hansen upon the Respondent's claims violated the eight 
year statute of limitations embodied in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-
22(1). The judgments should be reversed and vacated. The Respondent's 
enforcement claims should be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. 
THE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF LACHES PREVENTING 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE BECAUSE THE 
PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE WAS LOST OR DESTROYED 
PREJUDICING THE PETITIONER IN PRESENTING HIS PROOF. 
Similar in purpose and legal elements to codified statutes of 
limitations is the equitable defense of laches. In this action the Respondent, 
Julie (Hansen) Kik was guilty of laches because she waited ten years to 
bring her claims for enforcement of the equity and personal property 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered on November 15,1994, after the 
documentary evidence of Greg Hansen's payments to her no longer existed. 
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The equitable defense or doctrine of laches is based upon the 
equitable premise that "a court of equity is reluctant to reward a party who 
has been dilatory in seeking his remedy. As is sometimes said, equity aids 
the vigilant." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). See 30 
C.J.S. Equity Section 100; Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1968). 
"Laches must involve a delay and because of the delay there has resulted 
some disadvantage to the other party. Jacobson, id. Papanikolas Bros.v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975). 
Ms. (Hansen) Kik did not exercise reasonable diligence in bringing 
her claims before the trial court- She testified that the reason she waited 10 
years to bring this matter to the court was because "I did not want to get my 
£v :* children involved first of all, and he intimidates me and he always has 
throughout my whole marriage." Tr. 34. She had remarried in 1997, and 
was again divorced in March, 2004. Tr. 34-35. 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, testified to the payments he had made 
to the Respondent by checks on his accounts at, and by direct deposit by his 
employer to, the Moroni Feed Credit Union. He testified that he had paid 
Ms. Kik her equity. Tr. 43-47, 52. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Hansen had gone to the credit union attempting to acquire records 
to prove his payments to the Respondent, after the Respondent filed her 
motion, only to learn that the records do not exist and are only kept for seven 
years. Tr. 42-47, 52-58. 
Mr. Hansen had gone to his employer to obtain records of his 
payments to the Respondent almost ten years earlier and the records of his 
direct deposits no longer existed. Tr. 42-47, 52-58. 
The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified that he had been prejudiced by 
the Respondent's failure to make her claims for nearly ten (10), years 
because he could not acquire the records to prove that he had paid her. Tr. 
42-47, 50, 52-53. 
The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified as to the disposition and the 
values of the personal property. Tr. 38-42, 47-51. Mr. Hansen testified that 
he had stored the Respondent's personal property at his trailer for four to 
five years when he boxed the items up and put them in a storage unit at 
Universal Storage in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. The cost of the storage unit to Mr. 
Hansen was $55.00, each month. The Respondent's personal property 
remained in the storage unit for nearly two years. Tr. 47-48. Then the 
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parties' daughter, Christy, married and purchased a new home and Mr. 
Hansen asked her if he could move the personal property to her garage and 
he did. Tr. 46-47. 
The parties' daughter, Christy Dawn Mickelson, testified that her 
father, Mr. Hansen, had brought her mother's personal property to her home 
and put it into half of her garage, after she was married, over 5 years ago. 
She testified that she could not remember much of what had happened after 
the divorce because it had been "too long ago." She could not remember but 
some of the property of her mother's that her father had put in her garage. 
Christy testified that she called her mother and had asked her to come and 
take her personal property. She testified that her mother had taken the 
personal property from her garage to a yard sale. Tr. 58-61. 
In the circumstances of this case, Ms. (Hansen) Kik was dilatory in 
seeking her remedy. She did not act with reasonable diligence and approach 
the trial court to enforce the equity and personal property provisions of the 
decree in a timely manner. Her delay prejudiced the Petitioner, Mr. Greg 
Hansen, in his proof that he had paid the equity to her because the Moroni 
Feed Credit Union only kept cancelled checks and account records for seven 
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years. He was disadvantaged by her delay in bringing her claims because 
his employer no longer had the documentary evidence of the direct deposits. 
If Ms. (Hansen) Kik had been vigilant, and brought her claims within 
a reasonable time, perhaps six years after the decree, Mr. Hansen would 
have been able to support his testimony that he had paid her with 
documentary proof of his payments. Mr. Hansen was prejudiced and 
disadvantaged at the hearing because he could not produce his proof because 
of the long passage of time between the entry of the Decree of Divorce and 
Ms. (Hansen) Kik's claims for the equity and personal property on 
September 30, 2004. The memory of the witnesses had faded because the 
events had taken place "too long ago," as the parties' daughter, Christy, had 
testified. Papanikolas Bros.v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1975). Moreover, precisely the events and difficulties contemplated 
by Kessimakis, id., andHorton, id., and Lund, id., occurred in this case: lost 
evidence, faded memories, and stale claims. 
Indeed, the Respondent's claims to personal property were also stale. 
No Exhibit 1, to the Decree of Divorce existed in the trial court's file. The 
Respondent, Ms. (Hansen) Kik, and her attorney "retyped" (created) their 
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1 
i 
own Exhibit 1, and Ms. Kik "guessed" as to the values of the items on the 
exhibit the day prior to the hearing. Ten years following the entry of the 
decree, it is unreasonable to believe that Mr. Hansen could remember the 
personal property items on Exhibit 1, to the Decree of Divorce (which 
apparently was not filed.) It is unreasonable to believe that Ms. (Hansen) 
Kik could place a fair and reasonable value, not based upon conjecture or 
"guesses," upon personal property she had not cared to obtain nor seen for 
nearly ten years. The actual values, and Ms. Kik's perception of those 
values, arguably had changed over ten years. 
The claims of the Respondent on September 30, 2004, to equity and to 
personal property awarded her by the Decree of Divorce entered nearly ten 
years before was dilatory and Ms (Hansen) Kik was guilty of laches. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and vacated 
because of the delay of the Respondent in bringing her claims to the trial 
court and because her delay disadvantaged and prejudiced the Petitioner, 
Greg Hansen, in his proof. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY WAS BASED UPON CONJECTURE AND A 
GUESS AND THUS WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ENTER A 
JUDGMENT THEREFORE AGAINST THE PETITIONER 
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). In particular the "[determination of the value 
of assets is a matter for the trial court which will not be reviewed in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 
1982)." Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984). 
Even so, an award of damages based upon insufficient and 
incompetent evidence cannot be sustained. Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 
(Utah 1981). "A finding of damages cannot properly be based upon 
speculation or conjecture. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 497 P.2d 28 (Utah 
1972); Sumsion v. Streater- Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680 (Utah 1943)." DUNN 
v. McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY'& THURMAN, 584 P. 2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1978). 
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The damages awarded Ms.(Hansen) Kik by the trial court for the 
value of personal property purportedly awarded her by the Decree of 
Divorce on November 15,1994, were based upon conjecture. Nearly ten 
years had passed since Ms. Kik was awarded the personal property. Ms. Kik 
had made no claim for the personal property during that entire period of time 
indicating the importance and value of the personal property to her. All of 
the items of personal property were acquired throughout the parties' 18 year 
marriage and had been well used. These important and un-refuted factors 
bear directly upon the reliability, and competency of the values claimed by 
Ms. (Hansen) Kik. 
Another fact of importance is the lack of Exhibit 1, to the Decree of 
Divorce in the trial court's file. No valid order existed respecting particular 
items of personal property. Mr. Hansen cannot be compelled to deliver 
personal property to his ex-wife which he had not been ordered to deliver by 
the Decree of Divorce, and a judgment should not be awarded against him 
for failure to deliver it to Ms. Kik. Mr. Hansen testified he had never seen 
the Respondent's trial Exhibit 1, and that it was created by Ms. (Hansen) 
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Kik. The Respondent's counsel had "retyped" the exhibit the day before the 
hearing. 
Ms. (Hansen) Kik testified that she, or her attorney, had retyped a list 
of the personal property she had not received, and she testified to her 
guesses as to the values of the personal property. Tr. 7-11, 19, 14-33, trial 
Exhibit 1. She testified that the values she had assigned to each of the items 
of personal property the day before the hearing were a "guess". Tr. 17 
($3,500 china cupboard), Tr. 17-18 ($40 Indian picture), Tr. 18 ($40 Elk, 
$40 Eagle, $40 Indian pictures), Tr. 20-21 ($150 sheets and bedding}, 
Tr. 21 ($50 towels and washcloths), Tr. 22-24 ($200 pots, pans, cookie 
sheets, glassware), Tr. 25 ($75 bowls, saucers, plates), Tr. 25-26 ($30018 
1/2 year old bed), Tr. 27-28 ($500 16 year old freezer with meat), Tr. 28-29 
($100 Christmas ornaments), Tr. 30-31 ($1,600 Kirby vacuum), Tr. 31-32 
($1,000 bibs, winter coats, yearbooks, clothing), Exhibit 1, inter alia, ($200 
Books of Choice) ($50 Items of Choice from Old House & Tin Shed) (Plants) 
($100 Bar Stools & Half of Lawn Chairs). All of the items of personal 
property several years old and well used at the time of the parties' divorce 
on November 15,1994. Tr. 14-33. 
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A "guess" as to value of property (purportedly awarded ten years ago 
by the court and at the time used and many years old) is mere conjecture and 
is an insufficient basis for an award of damages. It does not meet, and here 
Ms. Kik did not meet, her burden to prove the values of the items of personal 
property by a preponderance of the evidence. A "guess" is mere speculation 
and speculation and conjecture are an insufficient basis for the determination 
of damages. DUNN, id. The values placed on the particular items by Ms. 
Kik on her "retyped" Exhibit 1, bemoan the unreliable, inflated and 
unreasonable "guess" of the value of a particular item. For example, Ms. 
Kik testified that the Kirby vacuum had been purchased new several years 
prior to the marriage for $1,600.00, had been well used during the marriage 
and yet is still worth $1,600, based upon her "guess." The values "guessed" 
as by Ms. Kik for used and mix-matched washcloths, dishtowels, plates, 
saucers, unspecified clothing, sheets, pillow cases, glassware, pans and 
cookie sheets, bed, an old freezer, choice of books, and the other items were 
extremely high and unreasonable given the nature and the age of the 
property. Exhibit 1. 
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The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified that he had been prejudiced by 
the Respondent's failure to make her claims for nearly ten (10), years. Tr. 
42-47, 50, 52-53. 
The Petitioner, Greg Hansen, testified as to the disposition and the 
values of the personal property. Tr. 38-42, 47-51. Mr. Hansen testified that 
he had stored the Respondent's personal property at his trailer for four to 
five years when he boxed the items up and put them in a storage unit at 
Universal Storage in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. The cost of the storage unit to Mr. 
Hansen was $55.00, each month. The Respondent's personal property 
remained in the storage unit for nearly two years. Tr. 47-48. Then the 
parties' daughter, Christy, married and purchased a new home and Mr. 
Hansen asked her if he could move the personal property to her garage and 
he did. Tr. 46-47. 
The parties' daughter, Christy Dawn Mickelson, testified that her 
father, Mr. Hansen, had brought her mother's personal property to her home 
and put it into half of her garage, after she was married, over 5 years ago. 
She testified that she could not remember much of what had happened after 
the divorce because it had been "too long ago." Christy testified that she 
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called her mother and had asked her to come and take her personal property. 
She testified that her mother had taken the personal property from her garage 
to a yard sale. Tr. 58-61. 
Mr. Hansen testified that the values of the personal property claimed 
by his ex-wife, Julie (Hansen) Kik, on her trial Exhibit 1, were not fair. He 
testified that the personal property was not listed in the Decree of Divorce 
and that trial Exhibit 1, was created by her. Tr. 38. Many of the items of 
personal property the Respondent claimed were given to her by Mr. Hansen. 
Tr. 38-42. Ten years after the decree and the exchange of personal property 
between the Petitioner and the Respondent, Ms. (Hansen) Kik, claims her 
personal property was not given to her. She has been not been reasonably 
diligent, and has been very dilatory which has prejudiced the Petitioner in 
his proof of the values of the personal property. Most of the property no 
longer existed, or was given to Ms. Kik. Tr. 38-42. 
Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the trial court in interfamily 
controversies in divorce matters, the trial court cannot act arbitrarily or on 
supposition or conjecture as to facts upon which to justify its order and 
judgment. Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1972). 
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The trial court in this action clearly abused its discretion when it 
awarded Ms. (Hansen) Kik a judgment for the value of personal property 
based upon evidence that admittedly was a guess, and thus based upon 
speculation and conjecture, ten years after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
The trial court's judgment for the Respondent, Ms. (Hansen) Kik and 
against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, should be reversed and vacated. The 
Respondent's claim for the value of the property should be dismissed. 
THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS, COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED UPON RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
AND UPON APPEAL BECAUSE THE MOTION WAS FRIVOLOUS. 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, is entitled to sanctions against the 
Respondent and her counsel because her motion for order to show cause was 
filed well after the running of the statute of limitations. The Respondent's 
claims before the trial court, and in compelling the Petitioner to pursue this 
appeal, are without reasonable and factual basis. 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, requested below and requests herein 
the award of his costs and attorney fees in the trial court on the basis that the 
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Respondent's actions was frivolous, and the eight year statute of limitations 
had run upon the enforcement of the trial court's order entered by the Decree 
of Divorce. R. 84. 
Rule 33(a), of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in an first appeal 
of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made 
or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, a 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be pad by the party or by 
the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper interposed for the purposes of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
In this action, the Respondent and her counsel were both personally 
aware of and direct knowledge of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on 
November 15,1994: ft 20*28,43-50,[52-66. 
Respondent and her counsel, Mr. Neeley, are charged with knowledge 
of the eight year statute of limitations upon the enforcement of the trial 
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court's orders and judgments and the Rule 54(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Mr. Neeley certified by his signature on his motion "that to the 
best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, the complaint is well grounded in fact 
and is warranted by existing law." Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. 
On September 30,2004, nearly ten years after the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce, the Respondent and her counsel file a motion for order to show 
cause demanding that the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, be held in contempt of 
court, that Ms. (Hansen) Kik be awarded judgment of $4,000.00, together 
with interest, her personal property or a money judgment therefore, and that 
she be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred in the misguided effort 
to enforce the trial court's order of November 15,1994. R. 67-75. 
On October 20,2004, the Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, filed his 
affidavit in the trial court, serving the Respondent and her counsel, asserting 
the bar to the Respondent's claims because of the eight year statute of 
limitations upon the enforcement of the trial court's orders. R. 80-85. 
Despite the Respondent's and her counsel's knowledge of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce ten years before, and the assertion by Greg Hansen of 
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the eight year statute of limitations governing the enforcement of the trial 
court's orders and judgments, the Respondent and her counsel proceeded to 
pursue their claims in the trial court at the evidentiary hearing on October 
22, 2004. R. 86-87. 
On October 22,2004, the Respondent and her counsel, Mr. Neeley, 
> 
wrongly persuaded the trial court that the order embodied by the Decree of 
Divorce was enforceable after the running of the eight year statute of 
limitations. Tr. 1-3, 61-62, 67. 
The Respondent and her counsel's motion before the trial court was 
not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law. Reasonable inquiry by 
counsel into the issue of the application of the eight year statute of 
limitations to the facts of this case would have quickly revealed to anyone 
looking, especially a reasonable lawyer, that the action to enforce the 
payment and personal property provisions of the Decree of Divorce was 
barred. A reasonable inquiry by counsel would have revealed the 
Kessimakis, id., case and the rule of law which directly applies to the facts of 
his case. 
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The Respondent and her counsel chose to pursue their frivolous 
motion in spite of and after the assertion of the eight year statute of 
limitations defense by Greg Hansen in his affidavit responding to the motion 
and after nearly ten years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. The Respondent and her counsel knowingly chose to argue to 
the trial court that the decree was enforceable despite having knowledge that 
it was not because of the running of the eight year statute of limitations. 
Their conduct was egregious and Mr. Greg Hansen has been compelled by 
their conduct to expend several thousand dollars defending their frivolous 
claims against him. 
The Respondent and her counsel had no reasonable legal or factual 
basis for pursuing their motion, nor to compel Mr. Hansen to pursue this 
appeal in order to vacate the judgment they obtained by their frivolous 
motion. The Respondent and her counsel have no reasonable factual or legal 
basis to oppose the reversal of the trial court's judgment arising out of their 
frivolous motion for order to show cause and the pursuit of their claims both 
before and after trial. O 'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
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Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall,75\ P.2d 1157, (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, should be awarded his damages, costs 
and attorney fees suffered by him in the trial court below and upon this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's claims to enforce paragraphs four and seven of the 
Decree of Divorce, filed September 30, 2004, nearly ten years after the entry 
of the decree on November 15, 2005, and the Judgment entered by the trial 
court against Mr. Hansen upon me Respondent's claims violated the eight 
year statute of limitations embodied in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-
22(1). The judgments should be reversed and vacated. The Respondent's 
enforcement claims should be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. 
The claims of the Respondent on September 30, 2004, to equity and to 
personal property awarded her by the Decree of Divorce entered nearly ten 
years before was dilatory and Ms. (Hansen) Kik was guilty of laches. 
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The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and vacated 
because of the delay of the Respondent in bringing her claims to the trial 
court and because her delay disadvantaged and prejudiced the Petitioner, 
Greg Hansen, in his proof. 
Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the trial court in interfamily 
controversies in divorce matters, the trial court cannot act arbitrarily or on 
supposition or conjecture as to facts upon which to justify its order and 
judgment. Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1972). 
The trial court in this action clearly abused its discretion when it 
awarded Ms. (Hansen) Kik a judgment for the value of personal property 
based upon evidence that admittedly was a guess, and thus based upon 
speculation and conjecture, ten years after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
The trial court's judgment for the Respondent, Ms. (Hansen) Kik and 
against the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, should be reversed and vacated. The 
Respondent's claim for the value of the property should be dismissed. 
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The Respondent and her counsel's motion before the trial court was 
not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law. Reasonable inquiry by 
counsel into the issue of the application of the eight year statute of 
limitations to the facts of this case would have quickly revealed to anyone 
looking, especially a reasonable lawyer, that the action to enforce the 
payment and personal property provisions of the Decree of Divorce was 
barred. A reasonable inquiry by counsel would have revealed the 
Kessimakis, id, case and the rule of law which directly applies to the facts of 
his case. 
The Respondent and her counsel chose to pursue their frivolous 
motion in spite of and after the assertion of the eight year statute of 
limitations defense by Greg Hansen in his affidavit responding to the motion 
and after nearly ten years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. The Respondent and her counsel knowingly chose to argue to 
the trial court that the decree was enforceable despite having knowledge that 
it was not because of the running of the eight year statute of limitations. 
Their conduct was egregious and Mr. Greg Hansen has been compelled by 
Aft 
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their conduct to expend several thousand dollars defending their frivolous 
claims against him. 
The Respondent and her counsel had no reasonable legal or factual 
basis for pursuing their motion, nor to compel Mr. Hansen to pursue this 
appeal in order to vacate the judgment they obtained by their frivolous 
motion. The Respondent and her counsel have no reasonable factual or legal 
basis to oppose the reversal of the trial court's judgment arising out of their 
frivolous motion for order to show cause and the pursuit of their claims both 
before and after trial. O 'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall,15\ P.2d 1157, (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), Maughan v. Maughan, 110 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Petitioner, Greg J. Hansen, should be awarded his damages, costs 
and attorney fees suffered by him in the trial court below and upon this 
appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this. day of November, 2005. 
-ANDREW B.BERR 
Attorney for Greg J 
Petitioner and Appel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /(fda day of November, 2005,1 served 
upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellaflftb DougrasX- Neeley, Attorney for 
Julie Ann (Hansen) Kik, the Respondent and AppelleX at 1st South Main 
Street, Ste. 205, Manti, Utah 84642. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. AMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND JUDGMENT 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Respondent 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-5055 
Facsimile: (435)835-5057 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GREG J. HANSEN : AMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO 
Petitioner, : SHOW CAUSE & JUDGMENT 
vs. : Civil No. 944600366 
JULIE ANN KIK, flea HANSEN : JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN 
Respondent. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Friday, the 22nd day of October, 2004, the 
Honorable Judge Paul D. Lyman presiding. The Respondent appeared in person and was represented 
by her attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. The Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his 
attorney, Andrew Berry. The Court, having received sworn testimony and other evidence, having 
heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
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Hansen v Kile fka Hansen 
Amended Order On Order 
To Show Cause & Judgment 
Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction in this matter and that pursuant to the parties' decree and 
findings, the Petitioner was ordered to pay the Respondent $4,000 for equity in the real property and 
to give the Respondent certain items of personal property. 
2. That the Court finds that there are major inconsistencies in the Petitioner's testimony 
and most of what he has testified to is questionable. The Petitioner's sworn affidavit is 
inconsistent with his testimony before the Court. For example, the Petitioner's affidavit 
suggests that he paid the Respondent $75 per month and $125 per month to the parties' 
daughter as payments for the $4,000 equity. Today, the Petitioner testifies that he paid the 
Respondent $3,500 by check and $500 in cash. 
3. The Court finds that the Petitioner's daughter (Ms. Mickelson), who testified today, 
had no recollection of any large items of personal property being delivered to her home for 
the Respondent. Ms. Mickelson recalls only seeing Christmas decorations and a lamp. 
4. That from the evidence presented to the Court, the $4,000 was never paid to the 
Respondent. 
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5. The Court finds that the items listed on Exhibit No. 1 are the personal property 
items that were awarded to the Respondent, but not given to her by the Petitioner, except for 
the Christmas decorations and the lamp. 
6. That the Court finds that the values that accompany each item of personal property 
on Exhibit No. 1 to be the reasonable and the credible values for the property. The Petitioner 
stated the values are unreasonable, and since the Court is left to decide the values, the 
Respondent's values are more reasonable, and the Court finds the values to be as stated on 
Exhibit No. 1 being $8,175 (subtracting $255 for the decorations and the lamp). The Court 
simply does not believe the Petitioner's testimony in regards to the value of these items. 
7. The Court finds that the Respondent made reasonable efforts and demands for the 
personal property items from the Petitioner. That she in fact contacted him 2-3 times each 
year, demanded that he make the items of personal property available, and that he pay her for 
her equity. 
8. The Petitioner failed, neglected, or refused to make the items available to her when 
he simply could have delivered them to her. The Petitioner did store the Respondent's 
personal property in a storage unit for 24 months and paid $55 a month for a total of $ 1,320. 
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9. The Respondent should be awarded judgment for the value of the personal property 
items on Exhibit No. 1 for a total of $8,172. The Petitioner should receive a credit against 
this sum for the reasonable costs for the storage of the items in the sum of $1,320. The 
Respondent should then be awarded a judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $6,855, 
which represents the value of the personal property awarded to her in the decree. 
10. The Respondent should be awarded judgment against the Petitioner in the sum 
of $4,000 for the equity from the real property of the parties pursuant to the Decree of 
Divorce. 
11. Each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter. 
12. That the Court simply does not believe the Petitioner's story in regards to the 
efforts he claims, to have made to deliver the personal property. Even if the Court were to 
believe his story, it still took over five (5) years for him to deliver the property, which is still 
unreasonable. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Respondent is awarded judgment for the value of the personal property items 
on Exhibit No. 1 for a total of $8,172. The Petitioner shall receive a credit against this sum 
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for the reasonable costs for the storage of the items in the sum of $1,320. The Respondent 
is then awarded the judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $6,855, which shall bear 
interest at the statutory rate until paid in full, which represents the value of the personal 
property awarded to her in the decree. 
2. The Respondent is awarded judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $4,000 
for the equity from the real property of the parties pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, which 
shall bear interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. 
3. Each party will bear their own attorney's fees in this matter. 
4. And it is further ordered that these judgments shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgements by execution or 
otherwise as established by affidavit. 
5. This Amended Order On Order To Show Cause & Judgment is retroactive back to the date 
of the original Order To Show Cause & Judgment of November 16,2004. 
DATED this J> day o^Apri/, 2005. 
JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN 
District Court Judge 
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